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By Stacey L. Schreft
I
magine sitting at a computer and with a few keystrokes having the
personal information of person after person appear on the monitor:
names, addresses, Social Security numbers, debit card account
numbers and PINs, bank account numbers and passwords, mother’s
maiden name, and more. This happens every day, and the information
is for sale in electronic markets. Buyers can use the information to
commit fraud on existing financial accounts or on accounts opened
with the information. This is the face of identity theft. 
Identity theft has been a feature of financial markets for as long as
alternatives have existed to cash transactions. Until recently, it occurred
on a small scale, involving, for example, the theft of personal checks
and the forging of the account holder’s signature to cash them. That
type of identity theft posed a risk to the individual consumer, and the
risk was relatively small: Access to the consumer’s personal checks did
not offer access to all of the consumer’s financial accounts. 
Such individualized acts of identity theft still occur, but more often
identity theft occurs on a larger scale. Data breaches typically involve
the apparent loss or acknowledged theft of the personal identifying
information of thousands—or millions—of people. This poses a risk to
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the individual but also to the integrity and efficiency of the payment
system—the policies, procedures, and technology that transfer infor-
mation for authenticating and settling payments among participants.
Identity theft can cause a loss of confidence in the security of certain
payment methods and an unwillingness to use them. Markets can cease
operating or switch to less efficient payment methods. Either represents
a loss of efficiency for the economy. 
This article looks at the nature of identity theft today and the factors
driving its growth and explores whether markets are able to limit its risk to
the payment system. Section I explains what identity theft is. Section II dis-
cusses the magnitude of the problem. Section III describes the factors
behind the recent growth in identity theft. Section IV considers the risks
identity theft poses to the payment system because markets provide too
little protection for personal identifying information. 
I. WHAT IS IDENTITY THEFT?
There is disagreement about how to define “identity theft.” Com-
monly used definitions differ in the range of acts that constitute the
crime. Some definitions are more inclusive; some, less so. The defini-
tion matters because it affects how identity theft is measured and how
it can be combated. 
“Identity” refers to the distinguishing character or personality of an
individual. A person’s true or inner identity—his or her thoughts, feel-
ings, and preferences—is not directly observable. The outer identity is
that by which others recognize the person. Imagine a list of all of a
person’s characteristics: birth date, eye color, address, parents’ names,
favorite color, bank account number, frequency of shopping at the local
grocery store, etc. The list includes unchanging features (birth date,
parents’ names), behavioral patterns (frequency of shopping at the local
grocery store), and identifiers assigned by others to recognize the indi-
vidual (bank account number, Social Security number, driver’s license
number). Each item in the list is a piece of personal identifying informa-
tion (PII), and the complete list is a representation of the person’s
identity. Others recognize the person by matching him or her against
the parts of the list of which they have knowledge.
1 Friends, relatives,
and co-workers tend to rely on physical features—the way the personECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 7
looks and the sound of his or her voice, for example—to identify the
person. Parties with whom the person transacts rely on identifiers that
work well remotely, such as name, address, phone number, and Social
Security number. The subsets of PII that are used in transacting can be
thought of as transactional identities.
Identity theft involves the theft of elements of a person’s identifying
characteristics (items in the list such as name, address, credit card
number). The United States recognized identity theft as a crime in
1998, with passage of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act (ITADA). Under the ITADA, “identity theft” is defined as the
knowing transfer, possession, or usage of any name or number that
identifies another person, with the intent of committing or aiding or
abetting a crime. This definition is broad enough to encompass the
theft of unique physical representations of a person, such as finger-
prints or voice prints.
2, 3
The ITADA definition encompasses the three types of identity
theft that exist today. At one end of the spectrum, it includes a person’s
stealing multiple pieces of information about someone and assuming
the other’s transactional identity, opening ID cards and numerous
accounts in the person’s name and representing oneself as the other
person. This is often referred to as “new account” theft. At the other
end of the spectrum, identity theft includes the more traditional exist-
ing-account fraud, where information is stolen about some existing
financial account and used to make transactions or access the account’s
funds.
4 This is known as “existing account” theft. A third type of iden-
tity theft is “synthetic” identity theft, which occurs when an identity
thief combines stolen information with fictional information to create
a new, fake identity. 
There is debate about whether the ITADA definition is too broad.
Financial institutions and other businesses and trade organizations
argue that the definition should apply to the less frequently observed
new-account fraud.
5 Lumping this type of fraud together with existing-
account fraud is claimed to muddy discussions of possible solutions
and efforts made to combat identity theft, which depend on the form
the crime takes. It also makes identity theft appear to be more prevalent
than if the more narrow definition, limited to existing-account fraud,
were used, raising more alarm among the public than some observers
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institutions to minimize the perceived prevalence and seriousness of the
crime, is likely driving the objections to the ITADA’s definition of
“identity theft.”
Despite the objections, the more inclusive definition is appropriate
because every bit of personal information that an identity thief obtains
counts. Technology now allows people to share information and form
networks, both personal and professional. This can enhance productiv-
ity and personal satisfaction, but there is a darker side to it as well:
Identity thieves are leveraging any information they steal by using pub-
licly available sources of information to fill in the blanks. For example,
social networking sites, such as MySpace and Facebook, and online
resumes provide information for those intent on identity theft. News-
paper websites commonly publish birth announcements, which include
the newborn’s birth date, city of residence, and the names of parents,
grandparents, and siblings. This type of information readily allows a
potential identity thief to identify the mother’s maiden name of the
newborn’s siblings and parents. Obituaries and marriage announce-
ments are also a source of information. One study found that a
mother’s maiden name can be inferred through automated searches of
public records with alarming certainty.
6 Similar research regarding
Social Security numbers (SSNs) is under way at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity.
7 From information publicly available from the U.S. Social
Security Administration (SSA), an SSN can be matched to the issuing
state and date, estimated age range of the recipient, and activity status.
The goal of the research, as well as the SSA’s provision of information
for validating SSNs, is to improve identification of fraudulent SSNs.
However, it also makes it easier for an identity thief to infer other per-
sonal information, such as place of birth.
8 Add in access by an identity
thief to a LexisNexis account or to the database of a credit reporting
agency or data broker, and compiling extensive information on a
person is simple.
9
Some retail establishments collect customer phone numbers or zip
codes so they can more effectively use direct mail advertising and
match customer traffic data to demographic data to better stock their
stores. An identity thief who obtains electronic records containing a
customer’s name and phone number or zip code from a retail establish-
ment’s computers, even if the credit or debit card number were not
stored, can use the reverse look-up feature of electronic telephoneECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 9
books to match the phone number or zip code with the customer’s
address. Of course, the direct look-up feature can also be used to iden-
tify an address and phone number for people whose names appear in
newspaper announcements of births, marriages, and deaths. 
In short, it is easy to compile databases with increasingly complete
records of individuals’ information. All identity thieves need do is
combine a little stolen PII with a lot of information publicly available
to use themselves or sell to other identity thieves. Consequently, the
common perception about identity theft is wrong. The theft of a few
pieces of nonsensitive data, such as names, email addresses, and phone
numbers, is not innocuous.
10 Even data intrusions in which little infor-
mation is obtained can put victims at greater risk of having financial
frauds committed in their names and with their accounts in the future.
Thus, the more inclusive definition of “identity theft” is more appro-
priate: Identity theft is a crime against the owner of PII, and that
person has no reason to distinguish thefts of a few pieces of PII that
allow fraud on existing accounts from incidents of new-account fraud. 
Individuals are not the only ones at risk. Nonconsumer entities
(governments, businesses, educational institutions, and other entities)
can be victimized also. Even computer security companies are at risk of
others masquerading as them.
11 In addition, identity theft requires that
such entities distinguish customers using false identities from legitimate
customers, which raises the cost of transacting and hinders their ability
to prevent fraud. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Identity theft has been around for at least as long as the paper
check. In the last ten years, however, incidents of identity theft and the
cost to the economy have grown dramatically. Only recently have data
been collected on the scope of the problem, which is difficult to
measure. Low-end estimates indicate costs to the U.S. economy alone
of billions of dollars each year. 10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Quantifying identity theft
Efforts to track the growth in identity theft and in activities involv-
ing the theft of PII began only in the 21st century. The measures
available are not completely reliable or easily compared to each other as
they rely on sources such as surveys of consumers based on their own
knowledge of whether they are victims, and reported incidents of data
breaches or malicious computer activity by businesses and other enti-
ties. In addition, none of these measures captures synthetic identity
theft, which often is not caught by a victim because the thief uses a mix
of authentic and false information. By one estimate, more than 80
percent of all new-account identity theft has occurred using synthetic
identities.
12 All of these measures therefore understate the problem, pos-
sibly dramatically. 
Most of what is known about the prevalence of identity theft
comes from annual surveys of consumers in recent years. One of the
most recent surveys, conducted by Javelin Strategy & Research, found
that in 2006 8.4 million U.S. consumers discovered themselves to be
victims of identity theft. Through misuse of the stolen PII, identity
thieves obtained $5,720 from the average victim. That implies total
fraud of about $49.3 billion.
13, 14 Add to that the $4.9 billion that con-
sumer victims incurred in out-of-pocket expenses to resolve the crime,
and the market value of the hours spent on resolution activities, which
totals $6.7 billion, and identity theft cost the U.S. economy about $61
billion in 2006.
15 The true economic cost is much larger because this
calculation excludes the cost of incidents not known to victims at the
time of the survey, the cost to consumers and businesses of security pre-
cautions to prevent future incidents of identity theft, insurance and
litigation costs, and resolution costs incurred by businesses, for
example. Some of the costs borne by businesses might be passed on to
consumers in higher prices, interest rates, and fees.
Information on the number of data breaches from hacking inci-
dents, loss or theft of storage devices, or other means, are available from
Attrition.org, an information security-related website. Attrition.org has
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breaches involving more than 221 million records through September
16, 2007. The percentage of breaches in which Social Security numbers
were stolen has risen dramatically as well (Charts 1 and 2). 
Attrition.org’s data only include security breaches that are disclosed
publicly, as is true for any measure of data breaches. Thus, the number
of breaches and number of records compromised understate the true
extent of the problem. The number of records compromised is under-
stated to a greater extent because in many cases the number of records
lost or stolen are unknown or not disclosed. 
Survey data also provide some sense of the extent to which data
breaches are occurring. Ponemon Institute polled 700 U.S. executives,
managers, and IT security officers in midsized to large businesses across
many industries in early 2007 and found rampant data breaches.
16
Eighty-five percent of respondents had experienced a data breach
involving the loss or theft of PII in the previous two years, although less
than 43 percent had a response plan in place to deal with data breaches,
and 46 percent did not use encryption technology or conduct data
security training after a breach.
The fact that records containing PII are lost or stolen does not
equate to incidents of identity theft. As discussed in Section I, however,
once a few pieces of information are stolen, other information can be
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obtained from public records or other data thefts and combined to
obtain more complete identification records, increasing the odds that
the owners of the information become victims of identity theft. 
Phishing is an increasingly prevalent technique for potential thieves
to acquire PII. Phishing refers to attempts by third parties to obtain
confidential information by tricking a computer user into disclosing
the information. Often an email is sent to the user that appears to be
from a legitimate business with whom the computer user might do
business. The email directs the user to take some action, such as
responding to the email or going to a website identified in the email
and providing personal information directly. Symantec, the Internet
security firm, attempts to block phishing emails and has been tracking
the number of emails blocked since 2004. The number of phishing
attempts has risen dramatically since then (Chart 3). For the first six
months of 2007, Symantec blocked more than 2.3 billion phishing
emails, which averages to about 12.5 million emails per day.
17 The
number of successful incidents is unknown. The sharp rise in phishing
attempts in the first half of 2006 probably stems from the development
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of phishing kits that can be bought and easily downloaded from the
Internet and installed automatically. These kits allow a novice to
rapidly establish a phishing site.
18
Thieves also frequent peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks
through which participants share music and movies, searching for files
on participants’ computers containing tax returns, credit reports, Social
Security numbers, and bank account information. P2P software, when
loaded on a computer, allows others to access the computer to search
for shared files. If the software is not installed properly or the computer
is compromised by certain viruses, the machine’s entire hard drive is
accessible to anyone else on the networks. During a two-week period in
late August and early September 2007, Tiversa, Inc., a company that
monitors P2P networks, identified approximately 56,000 searches for
the term “credit card,” 75,000 searches for specific credit card state-
ments, 50,000 searches for “tax returns,” and 317,000 searches for
“pin” and “user id.”
19
While the lack of accurate data hinders analysis of identity theft, it
is clear that efforts to steal PII are ballooning, and the risk of becoming
a victim is growing along with them. 
Chart 3














Source: Constructed from Symantec Internet Security Threat Reports 
from March 2005 through September 200714 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Examples of recent identity theft incidents
Another way to understand the growth in data breaches and iden-
tity theft is through actual incidents. In 2007, data breaches at
companies, educational institutions, and government agencies were
announced almost daily. Two that involved identity theft—the TJX
theft and the Monster.com breach—are highlighted here to illustrate the
scope of the problem. 
The TJX theft. On March 28, 2007, The TJX Companies Inc.
(TJX), owner of T.J. Maxx, Marshall’s, and other retailers, announced
that it had been the victim of a data breach that began in July 2005 and
continued into January 2007.
20 During that time, the hackers repeat-
edly accessed the company’s main database, stealing files that contained
information about transactions made with credit and debit cards and,
for transactions involving returns, names, addresses, and drivers license
numbers. It is believed that the hackers were able to decrypt whatever
data were encrypted. This was the largest theft of customer data
reported to date, with approximately 45.7 million credit and debit card
numbers reported as stolen by TJX.
21
The stolen PII has been used in fraudulent transactions world-
wide.
22 In November 2005, customers of Fidelity Homestead, a
Louisiana savings bank, started noticing charges on their credit and
debit card statements for fraudulent purchases in Southern California.
Those charges have been traced to the use of information from the TJX
breach. In the fall of 2006, a crime gang in Florida rented cars and trav-
eled to 50 of Florida’s 67 counties, purchasing $8 million in $400 gift
cards from Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club stores with payment cards cloned
using the stolen TJX information.
23 They then used the gift cards to
purchase flat screen TVs, computers, and other electronics. The thieves
had bought a batch of 10,000 of the stolen TJX payment card numbers
via the Internet from a foreign source. 
The Monster.com theft. Another large security breach occurred at
Monster.com, the job-search website, and illustrates how a little infor-
mation from what might appear to be an unlikely source can be used to
do further harm.
24 On August 22, 2007, Monster.com announced that
the PII of 1.6 million Monster.com users had been obtained from the
company’s resume database and used over the preceding six months inECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 15
phishing schemes. The thieves registered with Monster.com as employers
looking for new employees in order to access the resume database. They
collected users’ names, email addresses, phone numbers, and the identi-
fication numbers of their online resumes. With this information, they
sent various phishing emails to the individuals. One appeared to be a
job offer, but required that the candidate be a Bank of America account
holder and reveal the bank account number. Two other emails appeared
to come from Monster.com and asked the recipient to download a new
“Monster Job Seeker Tool.” In one email, the link downloaded a key-
logger program to the recipient’s computer that recorded keystrokes
typed into the user’s computer, including online bank account
numbers, log-in IDs, and passwords, and transmitted the information
to the thieves. In the other email, the link downloaded ransomware,
which encrypted files on the user’s computer and held them for
ransom. The emails appeared legitimate because they contained per-
sonal information about the users, such as the users’ addresses and cell
phone numbers, obtained, of course, through the initial breach of
Monster.com’s database. The stolen information was traced to a com-
puter outside the United States. 
III. UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY THEFT’S 
RECENT GROWTH
The identity-theft crime wave has been made possible by a conver-
gence of technological developments that have allowed the digitization
and electronic storage of data, the conduct of routine financial transac-
tions and recordkeeping by computer, and the creation of legal and
illegal electronic markets in PII. As a result, identity theft has evolved
from a crime that victimized isolated individuals to a lucrative, though
illegal, business of organized crime rings. It has been fueled by legal sales
of data that have created additional points of access for identity thieves. 
Identity theft as digital burglary
The scope of the identity-theft problem can be seen by comparing
the theft of PII to a traditional home burglary. A burglar breaks into a
house to steal cash, jewelry, and other objects that can be sold for cash16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
or used by the burglar. During the break-in, the burglar also could steal
physical pieces of personal and financial information—for example, a
driver’s license, Social Security card, a checkbook. With the identifica-
tion documents in hand, the thief can commit fraud in the victim’s
name, whether on existing accounts or by opening new accounts. The
burglar becomes an identity thief.
Before records were digitized and banking and shopping occurred
remotely online, identity theft occurred on a fairly small scale. Home
burglaries, for example, had to occur on site. Only one house could be
burglarized at a time, with a thief having to go house to house physi-
cally removing items. Burglar alarms, barking dogs, vigilant neighbors,
and noise from breaking into the house, as well as the need to be phys-
ically present to pawn or sell the stolen goods also limited acts of
identity theft. Similarly, other common methods of stealing identifying
information, such as stealing the carbon-copy imprints from credit card
receipts, stealing PINs by looking over a cardholder’s shoulder as the
PIN is entered at the point of sale, and similar techniques, also had to
be used in person, which limited the occurrence of identity theft by
such means. 
Identity theft still happens the old-fashioned ways, but today it
mostly occurs digitally. The identity thief is most comparable to a
burglar who only steals a spare key to the house so he can reenter
whenever he wants and steal funds from the homeowner. By stealing
individuals’ PII, the identity thief essentially steals the keys to the indi-
viduals’ financial accounts and credit ratings. With the information on
a credit card, for example, the thief can clone the card and use the fake
card to make a cash withdrawal from an ATM machine. Unlike the
burglar, the identity thief can commit the crime many miles from the
victim, and even from the privacy of the thief’s home. The identity
thief also can operate on a larger scale than the burglar, robbing many
people at once, as when a hacker gains access to a computer database,
downloads the PII of millions of individuals, and uses or sells it. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 17
Technology-enabled identity theft
When identity theft is viewed as a form of digital burglary, it
becomes clear that the crime now can occur at much lower cost and with
a greatly reduced chance of arrest. It also can occur on a much larger
scale, with millions of people and businesses victimized at once. These
changes have come about as a result of technological developments that
have altered the way payments are made and everyday life is conducted. 
Although it is difficult to isolate technological developments that
have enabled the growth of identity theft, three developments stand
out as candidates. The first is the realization of Moore’s law—the pre-
diction that the number of transistors on a microprocessor would
double about every two years.
25 Since 1965, when Gordon Moore made
this prediction, computer processing speed has indeed increased expo-
nentially and lowered computing costs accordingly. Increased
computing power made possible comparable advances in memory
capacity and most other features of computers. A small laptop com-
puter can now perform functions and store data that in the 1970s
required a mainframe computer. 
The second development was improvements in connectivity and the
communications it supports. The creation of TCP/IP and broadband
(high-speed) Internet access were key. In the 1970s, researchers created
TCP/IP, short for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, a
set of rules for connecting different networks into a network of net-
works—the Internet. IP is much like a postal system for the electronic
exchange of information. It dictates the format of packets—chunks of
data—that are sent between computers and the addresses for the com-
puters. TCP allows distinct computers to connect to each other and
exchange streams of data, guaranteeing accurate delivery of the packets.
IP drops the packets in the postal system, while TCP makes the connec-
tion that allows the packets to be transferred between sender and
recipient. Thanks to TCP/IP, any two people with Internet access can
communicate and transfer information between them. 
When TCP/IP was originally developed, people had to access the
Internet over telephone lines; they would use a modem to dial into an
Internet service provider’s system to establish a modem-to-modem link,
which was routed to the Internet. Data transfer was slow on these18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
systems. Since around 2000, broadband Internet access by cable or
DSL has been replacing dial-up access. Broadband technology can
transfer information at speeds far exceeding those for dial-up. Develop-
ments in fiber-optic communications helped make broadband Internet
access much more cost effective over greater distances. With broad-
band, the connection is always there; no dialing up is necessary. If the
computer is on, the connection is present. 
As a result of these advances, powered-on computers around the
world with Internet service are connected to each other, even when their
users are not present. The link between computers also links people. It is
beneficial in that it allows communication and information sharing
among great numbers of people and across vast distances. It also allows
more transactions to occur remotely as evidenced by the growth of e-
commerce. These benefits, however, come at the cost of the user being
exposed to computer intrusions and the interception of data in transit to
others. Without effective security in place on a computer, anyone else
with access to the Internet can directly access data on the computer. 
The third development involves how people make transactions.
Advances in telecommunications and computing accelerated the shift
from cash transactions, which can be made anonymously, to transac-
tions that require the transfer of PII to direct and authorize the
transaction. The latter can be called information-dependent transactions
and include transactions made with checks, credit cards, debit cards,
and ACH. For example, in a credit-card transaction, the card provides
information that allows it to be authenticated, both for the validity of
the card number and the sufficiency of the amount of credit available
through the card. Once authenticated, the card essentially issues a set of
instructions directing the issuance of credit to the cardholder and trans-
fer of borrowed funds to the seller. The card then directs the card issuer
to bill the cardholder for the transaction according to the terms associ-
ated with the credit line to which the card gives access. 
These developments together have dramatically changed the extent
and uses to which people put computers. Consumers can now do their
taxes, manage their finances, and shop by computer—and store infor-
mation associated with each of those activities on their computers.
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with their customers by computer. More sensitive information can be
stored on computers and sent between computers than ever before.
And each computer is a potential source of PII for identity thieves.
The emergence of electronic markets in PII  
Independently, the developments discussed above would not have
fueled the growth of identity theft. Together, however, they have
allowed the creation of legal and illegal electronic markets in PII.
Legal markets. Advances in computing power have allowed the dig-
itization of paper records containing personal data. They also have
allowed that data to be analyzed and packaged in innumerable ways.
Data brokers purchase PII from credit reporting agencies and other
entities, combine it with information acquired from public records,
organize the information, and resell it to companies or government
agencies seeking to conduct background checks or otherwise verify
identities. Widespread, fast, and easy access to the Internet has allowed
the data brokerage industry to thrive.
26
Finding organizations willing to sell their customers’ data is easy.
For many entities, data are produced as a byproduct of their main line
of business, with almost no additional costs of production, and they
face fairly limited restrictions on their ability to resell the data. As a
result, the resale to third parties can be an additional source of profit
for them. 
It should be no surprise then that state department of motor vehi-
cles offices commonly sold driver’s license records, sometimes including
photographs, to data brokers, charities, political campaigns, and direct
marketers. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994 was supposed to
bring an end to such sales, but did not fully do so until the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the ban six years later.
27
Financial institutions and other businesses also have been found
selling customers’ information.
28 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999 somewhat restricted financial
institutions’ ability to use and share customers’ financial information.
The Act required these institutions to provide customers with a privacy
notice indicating their intent to share information with third parties
and offering customers the option of opting out of such data sharing.20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Regulations adopted in late 2007 under the FACT Act (The Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003) also allow customers to opt
out of a financial institution’s use of information received from an affil-
iated company to market its products and services to customers.
29
Nonfinancial businesses, however, are not subject to these laws.
Illegal markets. The same technological developments that have
fueled markets in the legal sale of PII also have spurred activity in illegal
markets in PII. The casual hacker who once broke into computer
systems for the challenge now can profit from his crime by selling the
information, even if he never uses the stolen information himself to
make fraudulent transactions. The online markets also provide a new
source of profit for organized crime operations, allowing them to steal
and sell personal information at low cost and on a large scale. The oper-
ation of legal markets in PII makes the identity thief’s job even easier:
It results in individuals’ PII being more widely disseminated than it
otherwise would be, which gives identity thieves more locations from
which to access the information. 
As with most underground markets, not much is known about how
the markets in PII operate beyond what can be observed by those who
gain access. Based on postings of PII offered for sale in September 2007,
bank account data on an individual was selling for up to $400 per
person, credit card details for up to $5 each, passwords for up to $350
each, and email addresses for between $2 to $4 per megabyte. “Complete
identities” were available for $10 to $100 each.
30
Pricing in these underground markets presumably reflects the expected
benefit to the purchaser, the availability of the PII, and the expected cost of
getting caught using the information. For example, financial account infor-
mation, including passwords, allows immediate access to the funds in the
account, partly explaining its higher price. In the case of brokerage
accounts, the balance available to the thief can be quite large. In contrast,
credit card information appears to be a volume business. Card information
is easily obtained and often sold in bundles (such as the bundles of 10,000
card numbers from the TJX intrusion for sale). The sales price per number
of cards is fairly low because the amount of available credit on the card
accounts is unknown, the card issuer’s fraud-prevention practices might
detect fraudulent use at any time and deny further use of the card, and the
cardholder might detect and report fraudulent use when the charges appear
on the next card statement. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 21
Information from credit cards for which further use has been denied
is also being sold online. This is hard to explain unless the information
bought is being used with other information to compile complete pro-
files on individuals. The sale of “full identities” is evidence of the success
identity thieves are having at compiling fairly complete profiles.
31
The benefit of hindsight
Identity theft is profitable precisely because today’s economy is
information dependent. Information flows where cash once changed
hands at the point of sale. False information is the equivalent of coun-
terfeit currency or stolen and forged checks. It is no wonder that
identity theft is a problem of the modern payment system. 
While the technological developments described above were occurring,
they were not matched by comparable improvements in what can serve as
transactional identities and how such identities are authenticated. Instead,
practices that worked in a world of paper transactions were carried into the
world of digital transactions, with dangerous consequences. 
In the paper world, transactional identities were tied primarily to a
single number—the Social Security number—and to a lesser extent to
the driver’s license number. People gave these numbers to businesses,
governments, and other entities for use as record locators or as pass-
words, making the numbers means of identification and means of
authentication. As a result, most other externally provided identifiers
(credit card numbers, employee ID numbers) were tied to these two
fundamental identifiers. The numbers would be recorded in the entity’s
paper records and stored. The records could be accessed, and stolen,
but only by someone physically present where the records were stored,
whether that person worked there or managed to gain access to them.
Since the large-scale disappearance of paper records would likely be
noticed, large-scale thefts of information were uncommon. 
The digitization of paper records made larger thefts easier, but as
long as computers were not connected, any theft had to occur on site,
directly from the stand-alone computer storing the data. As computers
became networked, both within an organization and to the world at
large through the Internet, the possibility of the data stored on them
being accessed by others soared. Without effective security measures in22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
place, anyone with the right skills could access the data. As the TJX
data breach shows, the theft can occur remotely and involve enormous
numbers of individuals’ records. 
The critical developments in computing, telecommunications, and
payments technologies were not foreseen. Had they been, new methods
of identification and authentication perhaps could have been developed
early on and prevented digitized records from ever containing Social
Security numbers and driver’s license numbers, if appropriate. Property
rights over one’s own information could have been enhanced. Laws
could have been passed regulating data security and clarifying privacy
rights and liability for security lapses. The heightened conflict between
individuals’ desire for privacy and the government’s need to accumulate
PII for use in background checks and verifying identities as part of its
national security efforts could have been considered directly, and
perhaps more internally consistent policies could have been enacted. 
IV. MARKET FAILURES AND IDENTITY THEFT’S RISK
TO THE PAYMENT SYSTEM
In the absence of a technological development that makes identity
theft undesirable by making it immediately traceable, just as caller ID
virtually eliminated crank phone calls, some identity theft will likely
always be present.
32 As with most other crimes, the costs of preventing
identity theft will need to be balanced against the benefits of doing so
to limit identity theft to an economically efficient degree.
33 If markets
could achieve this efficient amount of identity theft, the government
would not have to intervene, but this is not the case. Because asymmet-
ric information and externalities are associated with the transfer and
use of PII in making payments, the full cost of an act of identity theft
will not be borne by those best positioned to prevent the theft, giving
them too little incentive to protect against the crime. In addition,
payment system integrity and efficiency are public goods—goods that
markets tend to underproduce even in the absence of identity theft.
Identity theft further threatens their provision, creating a role for gov-
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Market failures associated with identity theft
For the competitive market to function efficiently, products have to
be distinguished by their characteristics, including the risk associated
with purchasing them, and their prices must reflect the cost of those
characteristics.
34 This requires that all product features are known and
their value to society captured in the purchase price. In markets with
asymmetric information, sellers know more about their products,
including the risks associated with purchasing them, than do buyers.
When externalities are present, some benefits or costs of a transaction
are borne by entities who are not parties to the transaction. As a result,
products are not always priced efficiently. 
Asymmetric information. Suppose a seller knows more about the
quality of a good it is selling than its customers do. Assuming that
sellers want customers to know of their goods’ positive qualities, it is
also reasonable to assume that sellers know the negative features of their
goods but might not voluntarily inform customers of them. Under
such conditions, a customer would pay a higher price for a good than if
there had been full information about the good’s features. 
Asymmetric information comes into play regarding identity theft
and the payment system because noncash transactions between a seller
and customer involve the transfer of some of the customer’s PII to
effect payment. In essence, a transaction involves the purchase of both
the product bought and the seller’s protection of the customer’s PII.
The seller’s safeguarding and use of customer data are material to the
customer’s evaluation of the cost of transacting with the seller. If the
seller is lax in safeguarding its customers’ information, then its cus-
tomers are exposed to the risk of identity theft. The price a customer
will pay for the seller’s product should be reduced by the customer’s
expected cost from misuse of PII. 
With asymmetric information, however, the seller knows more
about how it uses and protects data than its customers do. Some sellers
of otherwise identical products will spend more to protect consumer
data better and will want to pass the extra cost onto their customers.
Others will spend less on security and sell the same product at a lower
price. If customers have full information about sellers’ data security
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higher price from a seller offering better security; those who care less
could purchase the product from a seller offering little security. Asym-
metric information prevents customers from differentiating between
sellers based on security practices. This forces customers instead to
make purchase decisions based on their expected degree of data security
across sellers, discounting purchases from all sellers by the same
expected cost from misuse of PII. Consequently, different sellers’ other-
wise identical competing products will sell for the same price, regardless
of how much security is conveyed with them. Sellers providing better
security will earn a loss after data security costs are taken into account,
while those providing lax security will earn a profit. Strong-security
sellers thus have an incentive to provide less security. The industry as a
whole is less secure as a result, and consumers desiring better security
are unable to obtain it, even at a higher price. Such markets suffer from
a “lemons problem,” or adverse selection.
35 The result is that all sellers
provide too little data security, resulting in too many data breaches and
too much identity theft compared to what is economically efficient. 
Externalities. Even without asymmetric information, markets can
still fail to allocate resources efficiently when externalities are present.
Externalities exist when the consumption or production of one person
or entity affects another’s, meaning that it confers benefits or costs on
some other entity. Because some of the benefits or costs of an entity’s
actions are incurred by others, the entity does not consider them in its
decision-making. The result is that the entity engages too heavily in
activities that impose costs on others, and too little in activities that
impose benefits on others.
Externalities are present in any market in which transactions
involve a risk of data breaches and identity theft, even if sellers and
buyers are equally well informed of a seller’s data security practices. In
the perfect (and nonexistent) world of full information about the risk
of identity theft, sellers and buyers in principle can negotiate product
prices or contract terms to compensate buyers for accepting the risk.
Buyers might accept some risk in exchange for purchasing a product
more cheaply, the exact price dependent on their perception of the cost
to them of being a victim of identity theft. Buyers, however, have no
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impose on other entities, such as the cost to merchants and financial
institutions from the fraudulent purchases made with the buyers’ stolen
PII, or the cost to taxpayers of having law enforcement entities catch
and prosecute identity thieves. Because buyers do not incur these costs
directly, they do not consider them when negotiating the risk-price
trade-off associated with their product purchases. They accept too
much risk from society’s perspective. 
Networks are prominent in the operation of the payment system,
and they inherently involve externalities. Banks, payment processors,
merchants, card associations, security firms, and Internet service
providers all participate in one or more networks that process noncash
payments. A data breach at any one can result in losses at the others,
but individual participants will underinvest in data security because
each pays the full cost of its investment but only receives part of the
benefit from it; the rest of the benefit accrues to other network
members and their customers. 
A network’s security is only as effective as the security of the
weakest link—the participant most likely to experience a data breach.
36
Networks can adopt policies that impose minimum security practices
or contractually assign liability for data breaches to improve within-
network investment in security, but a network’s security will still be too
lax if the network’s own breaches can impose losses on entities outside
the network, including other networks, and the network does not bear
the cost of those losses.
The TJX data breach, discussed above, illustrates the externalities
associated with identity theft, even in a world with full and symmetric
information. The breach exposed banks worldwide to costs from com-
promised cards that had to be reissued. A few months after the breach
was announced, a coalition of more than 300 banks in New England,
where TJX had a large share of its stores, filed a class action lawsuit to
recover the cost of reissuing cards and of fraud. The total cost to the
banking sector of reissuing cards could come to more than $1 billion.
Fraud costs would be on top of that.
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Risks to the payment system
With externalities and asymmetric information associated with the
transfer and storage of PII in noncash transactions, markets will not
contain identity theft to an efficient degree. This threatens the integrity
and efficiency of the payment system as well. 
Integrity. Payment system integrity exists when system participants
have confidence that they can make payments safely and reliably to
execute transactions, when they trust that the payment system will
operate as they expect it to. It is analogous to the confidence the public
must have in the safety and soundness of the banking system for bank
runs to not create systemic failure. 
The integrity of the payment system is of critical importance because
at the heart of a payment system is an economy’s use of common means
of payment, which facilitates trading among the economy’s participants.
People are willing to use a particular means of payment because they trust
that others will accept it, and people accept it as payment because they
trust that it has the value it is represented to have. 
Coins and paper currency once were the common means of
payment; they have been supplanted by the use of credible promises to
pay (CPPs)—checks, credit cards, and debit cards. Use of these means
of payment all result in the issuance of a promise to pay for a purchase
in a particular way and within a particular time period. An extra degree
of trust is involved with the use of CPPs because users must trust that
the promises that CPPs embody will be fulfilled—in other words, that
the CPPs were not issued fraudulently. 
Identity theft challenges the trust that supports the payment system
in two ways. First, it creates fears of victimization. Second, it reduces the
effectiveness of established methods for authenticating transactions and
thus the safety and reliability of the payment system. If trust is lost,
people will be less willing to accept CPPs as payment, leading fewer
people to use them. Markets can cease operation or revert to relying on
methods of payment that are not dependent on the transmission of as
much PII. The overall level of economic activity may be reduced, affect-
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Efficiency. An efficient payment system minimizes the resources
used in making and processing transactions. If a lack of payment
system integrity causes people to avoid certain means of payment
because of their high fraud rates or high security costs, that alone
reduces a payment system’s efficiency. For example, people could shift
from using credit and debit cards to using more paper checks or cash.
There might be less electronic bill payment than would otherwise have
occurred, or less use of ATMs and greater use of bank branch services.
Identity theft might result in people not shopping online as much as
they might do otherwise. Evidence already exists of these effects. A
Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive Personal Finance Poll
taken in May 2006 found that 30 percent of respondents limited the
purchases they make online, while 24 percent limit their online
banking transactions.
38 Such distortions in people’s methods of making
payment and shopping and banking practices are an inefficiency in the
operation of the payment system. 
The risk identity theft poses to the efficiency of the payment
system when information-dependent transactions predominate resem-
bles the risk from counterfeiting in an economy in which currency is
the primary means of payment. In U.S. history, the most similar period
was the Free Banking Era, from 1837 to 1863, during which time
entry into banking was relatively free and banks issued their own cur-
rency. Counterfeiting was not rampant; in fact, wildcat banks—those
that issued currency and shut down operations before redeeming it—
were relatively rare in the Free Banking Era.
39 Transaction costs,
however, were relatively high. Lists of illegitimate currency were pub-
lished in bank-note reporters, which people would look to in deciding
whether to accept unrecognized currency. Some would argue that even
these transaction costs were relatively low. Still, every economy has
moved toward a single, uniform currency when able, eliminating the
bulk of such transaction costs. The European Union’s introduction of
the euro is a modern-day example. 
Another market failure. Markets cannot ensure the optimal provi-
sion of payment system integrity or efficiency due to two features that
make them public goods. First, no one can be prevented from consum-28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ing them once they are supplied. Second, one person’s consumption
does not limit any other’s. Public art and national defense share these
features and are classic public goods.
The optimal supply of a public good will depend on the benefit of
the good to all consumers jointly. The total benefit, however, cannot be
realized by any single private market participant because free-riding is
possible: People can consume the good without paying for it. This
results in markets supplying too little of public goods, including
payment system integrity and efficiency.
Market solutions and the role for government
The preceding discussion of market failures is not meant to suggest
that the private sector does not spend considerable resources to prevent
identity theft. Rather, it indicates that the private sector will not be able
to do enough, due to market failures, to adequately protect the
integrity and efficiency of the payment system. 
One step the private sector has taken toward containing identity
theft is the adoption of industry standards for data security.
40 These
standards specify what data are stored, encryption standards, and
penalties for noncompliance. To be effective, however, there must be
some monitoring of compliance, and the penalties must be sufficiently
high given the odds of being caught.
41 For example, the Federal Trade
Commission’s settlement with BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. is an example
of a fairly high penalty, although not one imposed by the private sector.
In response to the FTC’s allegations that BJ’s failed to encrypt or prop-
erly secure customer data and wireless networks, BJ’s was required to
implement a broad information security program and have the
program audited every other year for 20 years.
42
Payment system participants also can hold each other accountable
for damage from lax security procedures through their contractual
arrangements. However, many system participants have access to cus-
tomer payment data between the point of sale and final settlement, and
few of them can anticipate their ultimate ties to each other and enter
into contractual agreements that allocate the risk of harm from others’
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brought on theories other than breach of contract.
43 As a result,
payment system participants have difficulty recovering damages from
identity theft through litigation.
44
Losses from identity theft also can be difficult to recover because
proving the damage can be difficult. In Smith v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 741 N.Y.S. 2d 100 (App. Div. 2002), a class of bank customers
sued the bank for selling PII to third parties, including telemarketing
firms. The case was dismissed because the court found that none of the
customers had alleged receiving unwanted telephone solicitations or
junk mail as a result of the data sales. In Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing
LP, S.D. Ohio, No. 1:05CV756 (May 16, 2007), the court found that
customers cannot file suit for the threat of future harm from the theft
of hard drives stolen from the loan servicing facility where there was no
evidence that the information had been used fraudulently. 
Although recovering on claims can be difficult, defending against
them is nevertheless expensive. Consequently, news of the TJX data
breach and other prominent breaches prompted calls for additional
security measures. Merchants have called for new policies that allow
them to discard payment card transaction data sooner. Other noncon-
sumer entities are also rethinking their data collection policies. PII
cannot be stolen if it was never collected or retained. 
Another fairly recent step taken by the private sector is the develop-
ment of insurance products to cover losses from identity theft.
Coverage for consumers is available from several sources, at a cost of
approximately $120 per year, and appears to provide minimal coverage
against lost wages, legal fees for defending against lawsuits brought by
creditors or collection agencies, and select out-of-pocket expenses.
Notably absent is coverage for losses from fraudulent charges.
45 Busi-
nesses are also becoming more interested in insuring against costs
incurred in responding to data breaches.
46 Neither type of insurance
will protect against identity theft’s risk to the payment system, which is
an aggregate and a systemic risk, because the private sector cannot
insure against such risks. For example, identity theft insurance is com-
parable to airline flight insurance that reimburses policyholders’
damages in the event of plane crashes, lost or stolen luggage, etc. Such
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safety of air travel and choosing to travel less or by less efficient means
if there are frequent plane crashes. This is the systemic aspect of the
problem. Similarly, identity theft insurance reimburses certain damages
incurred by policyholders but does not address the risk to the payment
system from a loss of confidence. Something more like deposit insur-
ance is needed to deal with systemic risk to the payment system. 
Despite the effort the private sector puts into data security and the
prevention of identity theft, the integrity and efficiency of the payment
system are public goods that the government has an incentive to ensure
are adequately provided. Disclosure requirements to reduce the asym-
metric information problem, the clear and comprehensive assignment
of liability to address externalities, and other policy interventions that
would work much as a lender of last resort or deposit insurance work to
prevent financial instability—these are just a few examples of the role
that remains for government in addressing identity theft’s impact on
the payment system. Because government intervention brings with it
its own share of inefficiencies, policy options must be weighed carefully
before implementation.
V. CONCLUSION 
Identity theft costs the U.S. economy alone billions of dollars each
year. Advances continue in computer processing speed, communica-
tions capabilities across markets, and consumer and business payment
methods. Together, these advances have changed dramatically the func-
tions for which people use computers and have allowed legal and illegal
markets in PII to arise, fueling identity theft. Imperfections in markets
for goods and services contribute to the problem by limiting markets’
ability to provide sufficient protection against the crime. This creates a
role for government in overcoming these market failures with an eye to
protecting the integrity and efficiency of the payment system. 
Current government efforts to control identity theft almost exclu-
sively take the form of consumer protections, law enforcement
initiatives, and regulatory oversight of banks and their affiliates. These
efforts assist individual victims and aim to prevent the use of identity
theft in money-laundering schemes, schemes often used to fund the
drug trade and terrorism, but do not adequately address the marketECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 31
failures associated with asymmetric information, externalities, and the
provision of public goods. The challenge is for government to find an
appropriate way to protect the integrity and efficiency of the payment
system from the risks of identity theft. 32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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